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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of ROGER P. ADAMS. 
Petitioner. 
-against- 
GEORGE B. ALEXANDER, Commissioner 
of the Division of Parole; and ANDREW 
CUOMO, State Attorney General, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 0 1 -09-STO 1 13 Index No. 1642-09 
Appearances : Roger P. Adams 
Inmate No. 86-B-04 15 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Oneida Correctional Facility 
6 100 School Road 
Rome, NY 13440 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(C. Harris Dague, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
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The petitioner, an inmate at Oneida Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated February 20. 
2008 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. In 1985 the petitioner was convicted 
of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of twenty years 
to life. During his incarceration he was convicted of two counts of assault in the second 
degree and sentenced to a term of two and one half to five years, running concurrently to 
each other but consecutively to the murder conviction. Among the many arguments set forth 
in the petition, petitioner contends that (1) the determination of the Parole Board was 
”excessive”; (2) the Parole Board placed undue emphasis on the crimes for which he was 
convicted, and failed to consider positive factors supporting his release; (3) the Parole 
Board’s determination was stated in conclusory terms; (4) the Parole Board violated 
petitioner’s due process rights; (5) the Parole Board determination was influenced by 
political pressure and public opinion; (6) there were errors in the hearing minutes which 
affected his due process rights; (7) the hearing was untimely; (8) the petitioner was not 
provided a “proper” hearing; (9) the parole determination did not have a sound and 
substantial basis in the record; (101 the Parole Board relied upon improper documentation 
during the parole interview; and (1 1) the Parole Board’s decision was pre-determined. 
The petitioner maintains that the Parole Board, in relying upon the seriousness of the 
crime for which he is incarcerated, has re-sentenced him to an additional term of 
imprisonment. He asserts that it was improper for the Parole Board to rely upon his poor 
institutional disciplinary record. In his view the Parole Board failed to consider his efforts 
il t  reIi,iM! I ; I I  ion. He indicates that he successfully completed the AK i and AbA 1 programs, 
2 
[* 2]
as well as programming and/or employment as an auto-mechanic, a sign-maker, a building 
maintenance worker, a porter, an industries worker. a pantry and mess hall worker, a program 
aide, a vocational drafting employee and a member of a paint crew. 
The petitioner maintains that the Parole Board’s decision was conclusory and non- 
factual. He argues that the Parole Board violated his rights to due process in that it followed 
an alleged policy of the administration of former Governor George Pataki to deny parole to 
violent felony offenders. He also asserts that the parole interview was untimely as it was not 
held at least one month prior to his parole date. He maintains that the transcript of the parole 
interview contains errors. He maintains that the parole interview was illegal in that only two 
members of the Parole Board were present. 
The petitioner asserts that he has demonstrated his remorse for his crime, as shown 
by his programing in such areas as alternatives to violence. As evidence of his 
rehabilitation, he indicates he has made charitable contributions to (and participates in) 
Tomorrow’s Children Marathon Fund. He also donates to the Make A Wish Foundation. 
He contends that his sentencing minutes are incomplete. In his view the Parole Board’s 
decision was predetermined. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“After a review of your rec ord, a personal interview, and 
deliberation, parole is denied. Your program completions and 
release plans are noted. The sentencing minutes you provided 
have also been considered. Your criminal conduct includes 
convictions for murder 2”d degree and assault 2nd degree. When 
this is considered with your poor disciplinary record, which 
includes numerous tickets for creating disturbances, violating 
direct orders, fighting and violent conduct; and requiredlrelevant 
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factors, it is concluded that your discretionary release at this 
time is incompatible with the welfare of the community and 
inappropriate at this time.” 
Turning first to a threshold issue, the Court notes that the petitioner has made a motion 
for assignment of counsel. The Court finds that his motion must be denied. In cases such 
as the instant one, there is no authority for the assignment of counsel without compensation 
(- see. Matter of Smiley, 36 NY2d 433 [ 19751; Wills v City ofTroy, 258 AD2d 849, [3d Dept., 
19991). 
Turning to the merits stated in Executive Law 8259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
perfoiiiiance, if any, as a panticipant in a twipordry Ideabe 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
rcpiesmtative [I” (Executive Law 9259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
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200 11). If the parole board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, 
the board's determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 
supra). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitatejudicial intervention (see Matter of Silinon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Rd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the abcy" e, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parok Board (see Matter of Peje7 v, 
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record, A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner's institutional programming and his plans upon release. He was afforded 
ample opportunity to speak on his own behalf. The transcript appears to be sufficient on its 
face, and is more than adequate for purposes of providing meaningful review. The Court 
finds that the transcript of the parole interview satisfied the requirements of Executive Law 
6 259-i ( 6 )  (d, Gi.diilm v NLLV Yolk State Divisiclu of Pdiule, 269 AD2d 628 [3'd D ~ y i . ,  
20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex rel. Grimaldij-Warden, 174 AD2d 497 [First 
Dept., 19911, lv to appeal denied 78 NY2d 858; see also, Matter of Reynoso v Cooinbe, 229 
AD2d 732. 733 [3rd Dept., 19961, Iv denied 89 NY2d 801 ). In addition, under the rules of 
the Division of Parole, it is proper for the interview to be conducted by a panel of two Board 
members (see 9 NYCRR 8002.2 [b]). 
1 he decision of the Parole Board was sufticiently detailed to inform the petitioner of 
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the reasons for the denial ofparole and it satisfied the requiianents of Executive Law $259-i 
(- see Matter of Siao-Pao. 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of \!.t+\ehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 
[3rd Dept.. 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Di-&ion of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 
[3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the 
seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (m Matter of Weir v. New York 
State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., ! 9941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New 
York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra: Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 
863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight 
to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly 
discuss each one (see Matter CI! \\ 1 1 ~  \ h 15 ’1 L)iil b t , i i ~  L ~ J ;  ‘ ~ 1 ~ 1 1  UL Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd 
Dept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the 
first sentence of Executive Law $ 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see_ &!atter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 
AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give 
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for 
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the 
other statutory factors, in determining whcthcr thc individu! ‘17, ill I i l  L‘ cind rcmain at l i h r t y  
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v NewKork State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
i 1  rill 1c:gaId u ihe sciitcnLing mimics, it appKau3 i i o i i i  L ~ C ‘  1 ~ w i J  ~ l i ~ i i  I jcLlivLil  ~ J J  ui 
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Parole made a good faith effort to obtain the minutes from the office of the Albany County 
Clerk, but that they are no longer available. Notably hoivever, the petitioner submitted a 
reasonably complete copy of the sentencing minutes which reveals that Albany County Court 
Judge Joseph Harris harbored absolutely no sympathy for the petitioner. In particular Judge 
Harris expressly stated that he wanted any future Parole Board to know that the petitioner 
had reneged on his plea bargain by not cooperating with the prosecution, and that he had 
shown no remorse for his crime.’ Under such circumstances the Court finds that there has 
been substantial compliance with Executive Law 259-i (2) (c) (A). in that relevant portions 
of the sentencing minutes were considered. 
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re- 
sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple 
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see LLiLLCi’  ~11 U ~ L I ~ L I  1 k i i  1 . ~ 1 - 1 ~  bidid 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has 
xrved his or her minimum smtence doc; not confer upon the inmate a protected libGrty 
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 1 14. 1 1 15 [3rd Dept., 
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of 
‘Judge Harris stated the following: “My recommendation to the Parole Board is that when 
[Detitioner’s murder victim] rises from the grave and tells the Parole Board that it’s all rig-ht with 
him for you to go free, that’s soon enough.” Incredibly, the petitioner commented during his 
parole interview “. . .the Judge. . . he didn’t like mefor some reason.” (emphasis supplied) 
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petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of 
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141. 1142 [3rd Dept.. 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]: 
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20071). 
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly. finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shim v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept.. 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter ofLittle v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison, 
38 AD3d 1030, 1031 [3rd Dep., 20071; Matter of Garofolo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3rd 
Dept., 20081; Matter of MacKenzie v Dennison, AD3d -366 NYS2d 384 [3rd Dept., 
October 22,20081). Nor does the Court find that there is any evidence that the Parole Board 
decision was otherwise predetermined. There is no evidence in the record that political 
pressure played a role in the Parole Board's determination.. 
With r q x c t  to petitionsr's argument that the A p p d s  Unit failccl to issue a timely 
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying 
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her 
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial 
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR fj 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York 
State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, Iv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex 
ici. 1 jiei v 1 ~ d u ,  209 Au2d U J U  [jrd Oept., 2C)OOj). 
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Turning to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to due 
process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the constitution 
of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates of the 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1,7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,73. supra). It  has been repeatedly held that Executive Law 
5 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate expectation of, 
release; therefore. no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by the Parole 
Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (e Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169, 17 1 [2d 
Cir.. 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40,44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 
661, 664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-1368 [SD NY, 
19811; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76, supra, Matter 
of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v New York State 
Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, accordingly, finds no 
due process violation. 
In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board's discrctioii arid was supported by the rccord (see Matter vfTatla 
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
h w h l  procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
9 
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petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court. by separate order, 
is senlin; all records submitted for in camera rcview. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED, that petitioner’s motion for assignment of counsel be and hereby is 
denied; and it is further 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: October 1 ,2009 
Troy, New York Supreme Court Justice 





Order To Show Cause dated March 11,2009, Petition. Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
Petitioner’s Affidavit In Support of Motion For Assignment of Counsel 
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